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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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SECRET

DATE : 051 24 FEB 62

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: JUN 2001

ROUTING

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EXEMPT

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PRIORITY

IN 32813

PRITY [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yr (C)

DELIVER FOLLOWING FROM WILLIAM BUNDY DEFENSE EYES ONLY NITZE FOR MCNAMARA PASS STATE ALSO WHITE HOUSE FOR MCGEORGE BUNDY.

AT GENERALISSIMOS REQUEST HAD LONG APPOINTMENT WITH HIM EVENING 23RD. PRESENT WERE RAY CLINE AND GENERAL CHIANG CHING KUO AND INTERPRETER GENERAL I FUEN.

GIMO BEGAN BY ASKING BUNDY REACTION TO SO-CALLED GRC COUNTERATTACK PROJECT. BUNDY REPLIED THAT HE NOT DIRECTLY CONCERNED THIS MATTER AND HAD NO AUTHORITY EXPRESS USG VIEWS BUT HAD TALKED THAT AFTERNOON TO CHING KUO AND HAD READ TRANSLATED MEMORANDUM OF PROJECT. (THIS TEXT TRANSMITTED SEPARATELY.) HIS INITIAL OBSERVATION COULD ONLY BE THAT PROPOSAL CLEARLY INTERESTING AND IMPORTANT. GIMO THEN STATED US NATURALLY VITALLY CONCERNED GRC COUNTERATTACK PLANNING AND LAUNCHED INTO

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LONG STATEMENT OF BASIC PRINCIPLES AS FOLLOWS:

A. GRC WOULD NEVER EMBARRASS US BY ITS ACTION.

B. GRC WOULD NOT ACT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO AFFECT SECURITY OF TAIWAN AND PENGHU.

C. GRC WOULD NOT GIVE USSR PRETEXT TO EXPAND HOSTILITIES.

D. US WOULD BEAR NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR GRC ACTION ON MAINLAND AND ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN IN SUCH A WAY THAT THERE WOULD BE NO EVIDENCE OF US SUPPORT. GRC INTENDED TO AVOID DRAGGING US INTO LOCAL WAR OVER MAINLAND LET ALONE INTO GENERAL WAR.

E. GRC WOULD ALWAYS CONSIDER US INTERESTS IN ITS PLANS AND IN PARTICULAR HAD A MORAL RESPONSIBILITY TO USE US-PROVIDED MILITARY EQUIPMENT ONLY IN A WAY SERVING US INTERESTS. (COMMENT: THIS REMARK COULD BE CONSTRUED AS INDICATING GRC CONSIDERED IT HAD GREATER LATITUDE IN ACTIONS NOT USING SUCH EQUIPMENT.)

BUNDY INTERJECTED THAT IT WAS MOST DIFFICULT FOR THE US TO BE DISSOCIATED AND NOT BLAMED FOR ANY ACTION TAKEN BY THE GRC. FOR THIS REASON AS WELL AS FOR THE WIDER GRC-US RELATIONSHIP IT WAS VITAL THAT THERE BE THE CLOSEST JOINT CONSULTATION ON ANY ACTION TAKEN.

GIMO THEN WENT ON THAT SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF ACTION WOULD HAVE GREAT EFFECT ON WHOLE FREE WORLD. NOT ONLY SURVIVAL OF GRC BUT WHOLE COMMUNIST STRATEGIC THREAT WAS AT STAKE. SUCCESS MUST BE ASSURED SINCE FAILURE WOULD BE AS DAMAGING AS SUCCESS WOULD BE HELPFUL.

GIMO CONTINUED ON THEME OF US RESPONSIBILITY AS LEADER OF FREE WORLD. LOSS OF CHINA MAINLAND HAD BEEN KEY SHIFT IN BALANCE OF POWER AND TRENDS SINCE HAD CONTINUED ADVERSE. US SHOULD TRY TO REGAIN BALANCE OF POWER AND TO SAVE PEOPLE NOW IN COMMIE SLAVERY. GRC COUNTERATTACK PROJECT KEY PART OF THIS SITUATION. US ANNOUNCED POLICY WAS FOR LIBERATION OF CAPTIVE PEOPLES BUT IN EIGHT YEARS EISENHOWER HAD ACHIEVED LITTLE TOWARD THIS. NOW KENNEDY MUST TAKE ACTION AND NOT MERELY STATE AIM. GRC CONSIDERED OPPORTUNITY SUCH ACTION NOW EXISTED BECAUSE OF:

A. SINO-SOVIET RIFT.

B. CHICOM ECONOMIC FAILURE ON MAINLAND

C. LOSS OF CONTROL OF PEOPLE ON MAINLAND. (NO SPECIFIC EVIDENCE GIVEN.)

BUT STRENGTH WAS NEEDED TO SEIZE THIS OPPORTUNITY. GRC FORCES WERE WELL-TRAINED AND READY AND BEST STRENGTH AVAILABLE. COMMUNISH

MUST BE ATTACKED AT ITS MOST VULNERABLE AREA EVEN AT COMMUNIST STRATEGY WAS TO STRIKE FREE WORLD WHERE WEAKEST. MAINLAND CHINA WAS COMMIE WEAKEST POINT AND ALSO BIGGEST POTENTIAL THREAT DUE TO POPULATION SIZE. US DID NOT HAVE CORRECT TOOL IN FORM OF FORCES TO USE BEHIND COMMIE LINES. GRC HAD PREPARED THIRTEEN YEARS AND NOW HAD FORCES EQUAL TO THE TASK IN VIEW OF CRITICAL MAINLAND SITUATION. GIMO WISHED USG TO KNOW THIS AND TO BE AWARE HIS VIEW THAT NOW WAS TIME TO TAKE ACTION AND NOT LET OPPORTUNITY SLIP.

BUNDY REPLIED USG AND PRESIDENT IN PARTICULAR FIRMLY HELD ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF LIBERATING CAPTIVE PEOPLES INCLUDING PARTICULARLY CHINA MAINLAND. TIMING AND CAPABILITY HAD ALWAYS BEEN THE ISSUES. USG MUST BE SURE ANY EFFORT WOULD NOT FAIL. THIS AND IMPORTANCE OF STAKES AS STATED BY GIMO UNDERLINED THAT JOINT CONSULTATION AND APPRECIATION OF SITUATION VITAL. MOREOVER THIS PROJECT CONSIDERABLY EXPANDED SCALE OF WILD DRAGON PLAN AGREED IN 1960 (FOR CREATION 20-MAN TEAMS) AND THUS SPECIFICALLY REQUIRED JOINT STUDY.

GIMO BRIEFLY RESPONDED THAT PROJECT SHOULD BE STUDIED JOINTLY. THEN EXPANDED SOMEWHAT ON SPECIFICS STATING THAT GRC

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HAD CONCLUDED DROPPING LESS THAT 200-300 MAN INITIAL FORCE WOULD NOT BE EFFECTIVE. CONCLUSION FROM EXPERIENCE AND STUDY WAS THAT SMALLER TEAMS WOULD FAIL AND GIMO WOULD NOT TAKE RESPONSIBILITY EXPOSING MEN TO SUCH FAILURE. APPROACH OF NEW PROJECT WAS SAME BUT MANPOWER GREATER.

BUNDY SAID HE WOULD REPORT VIEWS CAREFULLY VIA [redacted] E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C) CHANNEL. GIMO WELCOMED THIS. (BUNDY DID NOT SPECIFY TO WHOM HE WOULD REPORT.)

NEXT PART OF GIMO STATEMENTS SOMEWHAT RAMBLING AND COVERED ARGUMENTS THAT US COULD USE TO MEET PROPAGANDA ATTACKS AND AVOID DIFFICULTIES WITH OTHER FREE WORLD NATIONS. FAMILIAR ARGUMENTS THAT CHINESE CIVIL WAR HAD NEVER STOPPED AS SHOWN BY OSI SHELLING.

THEREFORE USG COULD ASSERT IT NATURAL THAT GRC FIGHT BACK.

WITHOUT SPECIFICALLY SO STATING GIMO THEN MOVED TO SITUATION AFTER INITIAL PHASE AND ASSUMED GRC FORCES FULLY ENGAGED. ALL THAT GRC WANTED OF US AT THIS POINT WAS CONTINUED DEFENCE TAIWAN AND PENGHUS (NEVER REFERRED TO OSI). US SHOULD NOT DIRECTLY ENTER WAR ON MAINLAND. AT ONE POINT GIMO SAID US SHOULD ONLY EXPRESS SYMPATHY

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FOR STARVING PEOPLE ON MAINLAND AND GOAL OF LIBERATION BUT THEN LATER SAID US MIGHT ALSO QUOTE SECRETLY OR INDIRECTLY UNQUOTE GIVE LOGISTIC SUPPORT AS WELL AS MORAL SUPPORT. WHAT GRC MAINLY WANTED WAS US QUOTE TACIT AGREEMENT UNQUOTE THAT COUNTERATTACK PROJECT WAS WORTHWHILE EFFORT ON BEHALF FREE WORLD TO LIBERATE MAINLAND.

GRC GRATEFUL FOR PAST US MILITARY AID AND NOW CONSIDERED FORCES ADEQUATE FOR TASK WITHOUT MORE DIRECT US MILITARY SUPPORT.

BUNDY AGAIN REITERATED NEED FOR JOINT CONSULTATION SINCE SUCCESS OR FAILURE VITAL TO US AS WELL AS GRC AND INDEED TO WHOLE FREE WORLD POSITION. SAID USG COULD SURELY NOT EXTEND TACIT AGREEMENT TO SOMETHING ON WHICH IT HAD NOT BEEN FULLY CONSULTED. GIMO AGREED.

CONVERSATION CONCLUDED AFTER HOUR AND HALF WITH GIMO SENDING BEST WISHES MCGEORGE BUNDY. BUNDY REMARKED HE CONTINUING ON TO SAIGON AND PARTICULARLY CONCERNED VIETNAM SITUATION BUT GIMO DID NOT FOLLOW THIS UP.

COMMENT. CONVERSATION FRIENDLY THROUGHOUT AND AS ABOVE INDICATES ALMOST WHOLLY ONE-SIDED. OPENING PHASE CARRIED CONSIDERABLE OVERTONE POSSIBLE UNILATERAL ACTION BUT TENOR SHIFTED THEREAFTER TO APPARENT

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ACCEPTANCE THEME OF JOINT STUDY INCLUDING CONTINUED USE OF

[redacted] CHANNEL FOR DISCUSSION THIS SUBJECT. CLOSING GREETING EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

UNDERSCORED THAT LENGTH AND THRUST OF CONVERSATION RELATED TO BUNDY

FRATERNAL RATHER THAN DOD TIES. GIMO NEVER REFERRED DIRECTLY TO

PRESIDENT OR SUBMITTING PROJECT FORMALLY TO USG SO BELIEVE

CONVERSATION DID NOT CHANGE STATUS DISCUSSIONS CONDUCTED THROUGH

[redacted] GIMO PRINCIPALLY USING WHAT HE THOUGHT WAS HIGH LEVEL EAR EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

AND SEEKING TO MEET OBVIOUS PRINCIPAL US OBJECTIONS AND CONCERNS

AND TO STRESS HIS VIEW THAT NOW WAS TIME TO STRIKE. AMB FULLY

INFORMED BY [redacted] EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

END OF MESSAGE

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